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RECENT CASES
AGENCY-PRIncIPAL HELD NOTIFIED THROUGH AGENT ACTING FOR
BOTH

SELLER AND PURCHASER OF REAL PROPERTY

The Plaintiff entered into an executory agreement with a seller evidenced
by a memorandum to purchase the seller's farm for $3,000.1 Later, Cash, the
seller's attorney, called plaintiff and said that another purchaser, the defendant, had offered $4,000 for the farm. Plaintiff told Cash that his contract
with the seller was enforceable and refused to pay more than $3,000, threatening suit if the seller sold to anyone else. Defendant later bought the farm
for $4,000 without knowledge of plaintiff's executory agreement or threat
of suit, whereupon plaintiff sued him, as well as the seller and his wife, for
specific performance. 2 The question, raised first in the Court of Appeals, was
whether defendant, through Cash, who had acted for both defendant purchaser and the seller, is to be held notified of the earlier executory agreement
between plaintiff and the seller and hence must take the farm subject to it.
Defendant urged: (1) he never had personal knowledge of the agreement;
and (2) Cash was acting adversely to defendant's interest at the time of the
transaction; therefore, defendant had neither actual nor constructive notice
of the agreement and should take the farm free of the agreement. The Court,
by a majority of four, affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment which required defendant to convey good and clear title to the farm upon payment
by plaintiff of $3,000. Farr v. Newman, 14 N.Y.2d 183, 199 N.E.2d 369, 250
N.Y.S.2d 272 (1964).
If a purchaser has notice of a previous encumbrance, he will take the
land subject to it.3 In this instance, defendant purchaser was represented by
Cash, his agent. Ordinarily, if an agent receives notice within the scope of
his employment, his principal is deemed to have notice regardless of whether
or not the agent communicated the information to his principal.4 However, there
1. The trial court held that this agreement was unenforceable because the memorandum
did not conform to the statute of frauds requirement. The Appellate Division reversed.
Farr v. Newman, 18 A.D.2d 54, 238 N.Y.S.2d 204 (4th Dep't 1963).
2. The Newmans, having moved out of the juristiction, did not appear. Farr v. Newman, 18 A.D.2d 54, 238 N.Y.S.2d 204 (4th Dep't 1963).
3. See Wheeler v. Standard Oil Co., 237 App. Div. 765, 263 N.Y. Supp. 272 (3d Dep't),
aff'd, 263 N.Y. 34, 38, 188 N.E. 148, 149 (1933). Knowledge is notice. Knowledge can be
either actual knowledge or the means of knowledge with the duty of using it. Notice can be
either knowledge as defined above, in which case it is usually called actual notice. Or it can
be notice through operation of law such as notice of a recorded deed, or notice through an
agent without any reference to whether the party charged therewith had or might have had
actual knowledge or not. This notice is generally called constructive notice. Long, Notice in
Equity, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 137 (1920).
4. The presumption of communication arises both from the "alter ego" theory of
agency, and the legal duty of the agent to inform his principal. In re Locust Bldg. Co.,
299 Fed. 756 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, Keighley v. American Trust Co., 265 U.S. 590
(1924); Vernon v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 171, 46 P.2d 191 (1935);
Farnsworth v. Hazelett, 197 Iowa 1367, 199 N.W. 410, 38 A.L.R. 814 (1924) ; Ratshesky v.
Piscopo, 239 Mass. 180, 131 N.E. 449 (1921) ; McCutcheon v. Dittman, 164 N.Y. 355, 58 N.E.
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are two exceptions to the general rule. First, when the agent has a duty to
a third party not to disclose confidential information, there is a presumption of
noncommunication to the principal based on that dutyY And second, when the
agent is acting in his own interest, or in the interest of a third party adversely
to his principal, there arises a presumption that the agent will not disclose facts
to his principal which would defeat the agent's or the third party's adverse
interest. 6 This exception is obviously the most difficult of practical application,
and unfortunately the least well articulated by the Courts of New York. Often
it is said that there must be fraud by the agent because fraud raises the presumption that the agent will not communicate any information to his principal which
would reveal the deception.7 Other cases, no less frequent, hold that it is not the
fraud, but rather the adversity of interest implicit in the situation which eliminates the presumption of communication. 8 This result is most often reached by
97 (1900); Howell v. Mills, 53 N.Y. 322 (1873); Hyde v. Bloomingdale, 23 Misc. 728, 51
N.Y. Supp. 1025 (Sup. Ct. 1898); Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1592 (1914) (concerning both the alter
ego theory and the presumption of communication); Holmes, The Common Law, 180-83
(1963). This has been called a "conclusive presumption" as it would seem to be rebuttable
only by rebutting the agency relationship, or putting the agency within the exceptions.
These presumptions and duties also include knowledge gained by the agent outside the
immediate transaction but affecting it and in the agent's mind at the time. Story, Agency
§ 140 (9th ed., 1875); 3 Am. jur. 2d Agency §§ 200, 273-74 (1962) (concerning duty to
inform); Long, Notice in Equity, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 137, 158 (1920) (concerning the alter
ego theory).
5. In re Locust Bldg. Co., 299 Fed. 756 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, Keighley v. American Trust Co., 265 U.S. 590 (1924); Farnsworth v. Hazelett, 197 Iowa 1367, 199 N.W. 410, 38
A.L.R. 814 (1924); Benedict v. Arnoux, 154 N.Y. 715, 49 N.E. 326 (1898); Henry v.
Allen, 151 N.Y. 1, 45 N.E. 355, 36 L.R.A. 658 (1896); 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 285 (1962).
This was the backbone of the argument below.
6. Innerarity v. Merchant's Nat'l Bank, 139 Mass. 332, 1 N.E. 282 (1885)1; Carr v.
Nat'l Bank & Loan Co., 167 N.Y. 375, 60 N.E. 649 (1901), aff'd, 189 U.S. 426 (1903);
Benedict v. Arnoux, 154 N.Y. 715, 49 N.E. 326 (1898); Henry v. Allen, 151 N.Y. 1,
45 N.E. 355, 36 L.R.A. 658 (1896); Murray v. Beard, 102 N.Y. 505, 7 N.E. 553 (1886);
Otsego Aviation Serv. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 277 App. Div. 612, 102 N.Y.S.2d 344 (3d
Dep't 1951); 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 139 (1937). But see, Annot., 4 A.L.R. at 1612
(1914).
7. American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.S. 133 (1898); Allen v. S. Boston Ry. Co., 150
Mass. 200, 22 N.E. 917 (1889) (questions whether it is fraud in agency, or activity outside
the scope that eliminates the presumption of communication); Innerarity v. Merchant's
Nat'l Bank, 139 Mass. 332, 1 N.E. 282 (1885); Benedict v. Arnoux, 154 N.Y. 715, 49 N.E.
326 (1898); Weisser's Adm'rs v. Denison, 10 N.Y. 68, 61 Am. Dec. 731 (1854). 3 Am. Jur.
2d Agency § 282 (1962); Meecham, Agency, § 721 (2d ed. 1914).
8. Carr v. National Bank & Loan Co., 167 N.Y. 375, 60 N.E. 649 (1901), aff'd, 189 U.S.
426 (1903); Constant v. Univ. of Rochester, 111 N.Y. 604, 19 N.E. 631 (1889); Murray
v. Beard, 102 N.Y. 505, 7 N.E. 553 (1886),, ("Uberrima fides," utmost faith); New York
Cent. Ins. Co. v. National Protection Ins. Co., 14 N.Y. 85 (1856); Torrey v. Bank of Orleans,
9 Paige (N.Y.) 649 (1842), Van Epps v. Van Epps, 9 Paige (N.Y,) 237 (1841) ("The
policy of the rule is to shut the door against temptation; . . . ." Id. at 242) ; Otsego Aviation
Serv. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co. 277 App. Div. 612, 102 N.Y.S.2d 344 (3d Dep't 1951); 3
CJ.S. Agency § 141 (1937); 4 Kent's Commentaries 438 (13th ed. 1884) (not dealing
directly with non-communication, but saying that there is ". . . the presumption of the
existence of fraud [which is] inaccessible to the eye of the court."); 2 N.Y. Jur. Agency
§ 269 (1958); Restatement (Second), Agency § 282 (1958):
(1) A principal is not affected by the knowledge of an agent in a transaction in
which the agent secretly is acting adversely to the principal and entirely for his
own or another's purposes, except as stated in subsection (2). (2) The principal is
affected by the knowledge of an agent who acts adversely to the principal: (a) If
the failure of the agent to act upon or to reveal the information results in a
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starting with the presumption that normally the agent will serve his principal
with all of his abilities and will always act in the principal's interest, rather
than as a disinterested umpire between two parties.9 This presumption is inappropriate where the agent acts simultaneously for two parties whose interests
are in direct conflict. 10
Although the defendant argued that this adverse agency rule should
apply in his favor, the Court held that there was a great difference between
the cases relied on for that proposition and the instant case. The Court
distinguished between an agent's knowledge on the one hand, and notice given
by a third person to an authorized agent on the other." Here, defendant's
agent, Cash, was notified by plaintiff who reasonably believed that the agent
was duly authorized to receive the notice. Where a third person dealing with
an authorized agent gives him notice, that notice is imputed to the principal. 2
That the agent is acting adversely to the principal's interest cannot impair the
effectiveness of the notice. The opinion implies that the Court might well have
come to another conclusion had the agent merely discovered on his own
violation of a contractual or relational duty of the principal to a person harmed
thereby; (b), if the agent enters into negotiations within the scope of his powers
and the person with whom he deals reasonably believes him to be authorized
to conduct the transaction,or (c) if, before he has changed his position, the principal knowingly retains a benefit through the act of the agent which otherwise he
would not receive." (Emphasis added.)
Sec. 282 is distinguished however from sec. 271, infra, in that sec. 271 deals with notification
and sec. 282 deals with knowledge. Comment (d) to sec. 282 says, "A notification is effective
if the person giving it has done the required act; a condition of mind of the one notified
is unimportant if the required act is performed." But see, Seavey, Notice Through an Agent,
65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1916): "Adverse interest or action by the agent is immaterial,
unless known to the notifier." Accord, Restatement (Second), Agency § 271 (1958):
A notification by or to a third person to or by an agent is not prevented from
being notice to or by the principal because of the fact that the agent, when receiving or giving the notification is acting adversely to the principal, unless the
third person has notice of the agent's adverse purposes.
9. Constant v. Univ. of Rochester, 111 N.Y. 604, 19 N.E. 631, 2 L.RA. 734 (1889),
Murray v. Beard, 102 N.Y. 505, 7 N.E. 553 (1886) ("Uberrima fides," utmost faith),
Conkey v. Bond, 34 Barb. (N.Y.) 276 (1861); Utica Ins. Co. v. Toledo Ins. Co., 17 Barb.
(N.Y.) 132 (1853) (aggregatiomentium argument-one mind cannot meet); 3 C.J.S. Agency
§ 138 (1937) ; Story, Agency § 210 (5th ed. 1857).
10. However there are cases which hold that if the two principals know of all the
adversity the agency shall be acceptable and both principals will be held to it. Strangely,
most cases do not mention the effect of this knowledge but it seems to be implicit in the
decisions. See Constant v. Univ. of Rochester, 111 N.Y. 604, 19 N.E. 631 (1889); In the
matter of Williams, 37 Misc. 2d 542, 235 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1962); 3 C.J.S. Agency § 141 (1937);
2 N.Y. Jur. Agency § 203 (1958), (Agent's duty not to act for adverse principals) and § 269
(Imputation of knowledge). But see, Empire State Ins. Co. v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 138
N.Y. 446, 34 N.E. 200 (1893) which seems to say that even with the principals' knowing
of the adversity there must not be an element of discretion in the agent.
11. Knowledge of the agent acquired not by the action of third parties, but by the
agent because of his actions has generally not been imputed to his principal when he is
acting adversely. However, when an agent is held out to receive notice and a third person,
relying on this holding out, so notifies him, the principal is held regardless of the agent's
adversity. See Central Trust Co. v. Folsom, 167 N.Y. 285, 60 N.E. 599 (1901); Crane v.
Greunwald, 120 N.Y. 274, 24 N.E. 456 (1890); Restatement (Second), Agency §§ 271, 282
(1958).. Both cases "estopped" the principal from denying receipt of funds which the agent
had at least apparent authority to receive, in spite of the fact that the agent was acting
in his own interest.
12. See note 11 supra.
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plaintiff's executory agreement in the course of his investigations and had
failed to inform his buyer principal about it.1', In that situation plaintiff would
not have relied on the authority of Cash to act as defendant's agent and
plaintiff would have been no worse off than if the seller bad sold the farm
14
directly to defendant.
The majority, in affirming the judgment, refuses to hold the defendant
insulated from Cash's knowledge simply because Cash also acted for the
seller. In the light of the distinction between notice given to an authorized agent
on the one hand and knowledge independently acquired by him on the other,
the majority considered it immaterial for purposes of imputing his knowledge
to his principal whether the authorized agent acted either fraudulently or on
behalf of conflicting interests. In any event, the opinion pointed out it must be
assumed with the court below that Cash was not guilty of fraud, but merely
of an "error of judgment." Finally, the argument that either fraud or conflicting interest precluded imputation of knowledge had not been raised below. 15
The dissenting opinion, without directly confronting the majority's position, stresses that the rationale for imputing his agent's knowledge to a principal
is the presumption that the agent will normally communicate the information
to his principal. But such an inference is not appropriate when, as was the
case here, the agent is representing a third party with interests adverse to
those of the principal.""
With two apparently innocent purchasers involved, the question before the
Court was on whom to place the risk of the dual agency relationship presented
here. The majority places the risk on the person who acts through an agent;
the minority in effect places this risk on a stranger to the agency relationship
whose actions demonstrate his reliance on its apparent efficacy. Stated that
bluntly it is not difficult to align oneself with the majority. An analogy to the
13. However, due to other statements of the court, this is doubtful. Basically, they do
not feel the agent was acting adversely as defined in Restatement (Second), Agency § 282
comment (c) (1958): "Meaning of acting adversely. The mere fact that the agent's primary
interests are not coincident with those of the principal does not prevent the latter from
being affected by the knowledge of the agent if the agent is acting for the principal's
interests." This would seem contra to the holdings of the cases in footnote 8 supra.
14. Had the buyer dealt directly with the seller without notice of the outstanding
equity, he would have taken the land free of that equity. Williamson v. Brown, 15 N.Y.
354, 362 (1857); Jackson v. Campbell, 19 Johns. (N.Y.) 281 (1822)j; Jackson v. Given,
8 Johns. (N.Y.) 136 (1811) ; see, N.Y. Real Prop. § 294(3).
15. This is the first time the defendant argued the adverse agency exception, and
the majority says, ". . . this court will not consider new arguments, whether of law or
fact, or both, where it appears that if they had been raised at the trial an adequate defense
might have been adduced by the other party (Osgood v. Toole, 60 N.Y. 475; Persky v.
Bank of America Nat'l Ass'n, 261 N.Y. 212, 185 N.E. 77; Cohen and Karger, Powers of the
New York -Court of Appeals (1952), § 162)." Instant case at p. 188, 199 N.E.2d at 372, 250
N.Y.S.2d at 276.
16. Citing Benedict v. Arnoux, 154 N.Y. 715, 49 N.E. 326 (1898), Otsego Aviation
Serv. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 277 App. Div. 612, 618-20, 102 N.Y.S.2d 344, 348-50 (3d
Dep't 1951). Also for the establishment of the rule citing New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. National
Protection Ins. Co., 14 N.Y. 85 (1856), Utica Ins. Co. v. Toledo Ins. Co., 17 Barb. (N.Y.)
132 (1853). Henry v. Allen, 151 N.Y. 1, 45 N.E. 355 (1896) speaks of notice to agent, but
there is no question of depending on agent's apparent authority. The previous cases do not
rest on notice to an agent, but only knowledge of an agent.
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torts doctrine of respondeat superior might shed some light on the majority's
underlying decision, to put the risk of an agency relationship on the principal
rather than an outsider. Among others, there are two social policy reasons
behind respondeat superior which may have been in the back of the Court's
mind.17 One is the ability of the master to control his servants as opposed to
the lack of control in an outsider. In the instant case, defendant was in a
better position to control his agent than was the plaintiff, even if this meant
finding a new agent. And secondly, the master, not the outsider, benefits by the
master-servant relationship. So too, a principal is benefited by being able to
do business through an agent instead of doing it in person. Because the agency
relationship is vital to our society it should be held effective whenever possible.
To penalize a person for depending on a relationship which, to all appearances,
exists, would substantially weaken the usefulness of agency law. Plaintiff, it
would seem, had no reason to doubt Cash's authority as an agent empowered
to receive notice of the outstanding equity. He therefore proceeded to do everything he thought necessary to protect his interest. Thus, it is difficult 'to see why
plaintiff, an innocent third party, should bear the risk of the questionable
activities of another's agent. It was, after all, the defendant who selected Cash
as his agent and, at least vis-4-vis an innocent stranger should assume the risk
of his conduct. I s Had plaintiff not dealt with Cash as an agent, he could not have
claimed reliance on the agency; if that had been the case, and in the absence
of other facts, this might have been a stronger case for refusing to impute to
the defendant the knowledge of Cash because of the latter's adverse interests.' 9
MICHAEL SWART

CIVIL PROCEDURE-JuRISDICTIoN UNDER "ToRTIOUS ACT" PROVISION
OF NEW YORK LONG-ARm STATUTE OBTAINABLE OVER NON-RESIDENTS ONLY
WHEN SUCH ACTS

ARE COMMITTED

WITHIN THE STATE

In two recent cases New York residents brought suits on theories of negligence and breach of warranty against non-domiciliary defendants involved in the
manufacture of products used in or sent into New York. Mr. and Mrs. Feathers,
plaintiffs in the first case, sued for personal injuries and property damage caused
17. Latty, Introduction to Business Associations 56 (1951).
18. Moore v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 55 N.Y. 41, 47 (1873).
19. This action commenced by Farr against Newman and Hardy appears to be the
only substantial basis for his remedy. Unfortunately, Newman left the jurisdiction. Though
it has been suggested in 9 Utah L. Rev. 496 (1964) that plaintiff might be able to recover
damages from the attorney on the theory of interference with contractual rights, this
would be a doubtful remedy in light of the court's statement that the attorney had not
acted fraudulently in considering the contract unenforceable. Defendant, on the other hand,
because of the agency relationship could possibly sue the attorney for a breach of that
relationship and stand a better chance of recovery than plaintiff would. The attorney appears
to have breached the ABA Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics 3 (Canon 6) (1957)
as well as general agency principles long accepted.

